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Abstract 
The justification for the restrictions on religion inherent in secularism is the subject of lively debate in 
constitutional and political theory. In Ebrahimian v France the Strasbourg Court was required to 
assess whether the European Convention on Human Rights can accommodate a secularism whose 
aims and justifications go beyond the protection of the rights of others and include abstract goals 
such as upholding the religious neutrality of the state.  
The resulting judgment highlights both the inability of rights to provide an adequate account of the 
relationship between religion and the state and how the text of the Convention struggles to give 
adequate weight to constitutional principles whose justification arises from sources other than the 
protection of fundamental rights.  
I suggest that the Court was correct to reaffirm its stance that secularism and strict neutrality can be 
in harmony with the values of the Convention. However, it needs to be more clear about the reasons 
for this stance and to be vigilant in its protection of private autonomy so that the use of abstract 
principles to restrict religious expression does not give excessive latitude to states to restrict 
individual autonomy and minority rights.  
Introduction 
The French system of regulating the relationship between religion and the state has been before the 
Strasbourg Court (ECtHR) on several occasions.1 Applicants from France and elsewhere have had 
little success in challenging rules restricting religious expression in schools and universities,2 imposed 
in the name of secularism, and the Court has clearly stated that state secularism is, in principle, 
consistent with the values of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).3  In Ebrahimian v 
France4 the Court was faced with a challenge to restrictions on religious expression in the broader 
public service, a context where concerns about respect for parental autonomy and proselytism in 
the education system which can underpin restrictions in the educational context, do not apply.  
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to thank an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments. 
1 S.A.S. v France [2014] ECHR 695, Dogru v France [2008] ECHR 1579, Pichon and Sajous v France, 
Admissibility Decision, [2001] ECHR 898. 
2 Dogru v France (ibid), Dahlab v Switzerland, Admissibility Decision [2001] ECHR 899, Şahin v Turkey 
[2004] ECHR 299. 
3 Refah Partisi v Turkey [2003] ECHR 87 at [114]. 
4 [2015] ECHR 1041. The majority judgment is in French and all translations are my own. The 
dissenting and partially-dissenting opinions are in English. 
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The arguments put forward by the French authorities in favour of the restriction of religious 
expression in the public service as a whole forced the European Court of Human Rights to address 
the justifications  
for secularism in broad and abstract terms. This required the Court to enter into the complex 
question of the ECHR’s ability to accommodate a secularism whose aims and justifications go beyond 
the protection of the fundamental rights of others and focus on more abstract goals such as state 
neutrality and avoiding religious competition for state power, issues that have become increasingly 
controversial amongst political and constitutional theorists. The resulting judgment, and the 
evasiveness of the majority as to the degree to which the imposition of a duty of religious neutrality 
on state employees can be justified by the text of Article 9 of the Convention, highlights the 
dilemmas  faced by rights-focused courts in accommodating broad constitutional principles whose 
justification arises from sources other than the protection of fundamental rights.  
This article suggests that, while the overall result of this case was correct, the Court must be more 
upfront in future about the fact that it is drawing on extra-textual sources in its assessment of the 
legitimacy of constitutional principles, such as secularism, that aim to defuse salient and abiding 
cleavages within societies. In addition, it shows that duties of religious-neutrality in state contexts 
raise complex issues in relation to the proportionality of rules that seek to prevent symbolic harms 
and require vigilant policing of the boundary between state and non-state contexts in order to 
ensure that promotion of state secularism does not become unduly limiting of individual religious 
freedom. 
Facts 
Ms. Ebrahimian, worked for 15 months as a temporary social assistant in the psychiatric ward of a 
public hospital in the Paris region. In December 2000, her contract was not renewed as she had 
refused to remove the Islamic headscarf that she had been wearing at work. Her employers justified 
this decision on the basis that the headscarf constituted a display of her religious convictions which 
was incompatible with her status as a public servant, adding later that patients had complained 
about working with an employee wearing religious attire. The French courts held that the hospital’s 
decision was justified in the light of the French state’s secularity (‘laïcité’) and the consequent 
obligation on those working in the public service to adhere to religious neutrality when carrying out 
their functions. 
Ms. Ebrahimian challenged this decision before the ECtHR arguing that the refusal to renew her 
contract constituted a violation of her right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
protected by Article 9 of the ECHR. She alleged that the decision to restrict her freedom of religion in 
this way lacked a sufficiently clear legal basis and was neither proportionate nor taken in pursuit of a 
legitimate goal as there was no evidence that her work had been affected. Ms. Ebrahimian’s 
challenge was rejected by six votes to one. 
Clarity of Legal Basis 
Although the duty of public servants in France to adhere to religious neutrality at work is now clear, 
it was less so when Ms. Ebrahimian’s contract was terminated. Nevertheless, the majority found that 
the decision to terminate the Applicant’s employment did have a sufficiently clear legal basis. It cited 
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the fact that secularism has been enshrined in French law since 1905 and appears in Article 1 of the 
Constitution. In addition, it noted that since the 1950s, the Conseil d’Etat had confirmed that a ‘strict 
duty of neutrality’ applied to those working for the state while the Constitutional Council has 
underlined the principle of neutrality as a fundamental principle of the public service.5 However, the 
Court acknowledged that when the Applicant was first employed, this jurisprudence was not 
sufficiently clear for her to have been able to foresee that her expression of her religious convictions 
and identity would be subject to restrictions at work. In the Court’s view, it was only when the 
Conseil d’Etat issued an opinion on religious symbols in the public service in May 2000 (six months 
before her contract was not renewed) that it was sufficiently clear to the Applicant that she was 
required to remove her headscarf while at work.6  
Judge O’Leary sharply questioned whether a court ruling, months after the applicant had been 
employed, could be seen to have provided the level of certainty and accessibility required by Court’s 
case law, arguing that ‘the majority judgment could be read as assessing the requirement of 
lawfulness not with reference to the law as it stood then but with reference to the law as it stands 
now, following 15 years of a wide and undoubtedly sensitive debate in French society.’7 Allowing 
victory for the Applicant on this fact-sensitive point may have been politically astute as it would have 
allowed the Court to counter arguments that it has been unsympathetic to religious minorities while 
at the same time avoiding questioning the norms of the French system of state secularism more 
widely but the majority did not take this option. 
A Mix of Abstract and Concrete Reasons for Restrictions of Religious Expression 
Having found that the restriction was in accordance with law, the majority noted the wide margin of 
appreciation that applies in relation to norms around the relationship of religion and state in 
Europe.8 It then offered two sets of reasons why the restriction was also legitimate and 
proportionate. One set of reasons was relatively concrete while the other focused more on abstract 
constitutional principles. 
Unfortunately, the Court was not entirely clear as to when it was relying on the abstract claim and 
when it was relying on the more concrete impact on the rights of those coming into contact with Ms. 
Ebrahimian at work. In a key section,9 it noted that a restriction of religious expression in a context 
of vulnerability of users of public services could be seen as pursuing the legitimate goal of protecting 
the rights and freedoms of others in that it sought to preserve respect for the beliefs of patients and 
users of public services and to ensure that they benefited from equal treatment without distinction 
as to their religion.10 However, the same paragraph goes on to say that the Court ‘equally recalls that 
the safeguarding of the principle of secularism constitutes an objective that is in conformity with the 
values underlying the Convention’ concluding that ‘in these conditions [the prohibition on the 
Applicant wearing her headscarf at work] pursued the objective of protection of the rights and 
                                                          
5 ibid at [50]. 
6 ibid at [51]. 
7 ibid, partially-dissenting opinion of Judge O’Leary. 
8 n 4 above at [56]. 
9 ibid at [53]. 
10 ibid. 
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freedoms of others,’11 thus implying that defence of secularism in the abstract was equally a 
legitimate goal for the purposes of the Convention and could fall within the concept of defence of 
the rights of others. 
The Court buttressed this conclusion by reference to a line of cases where it had previously upheld 
limitations imposed in the name of secularism on religious expression in state contexts. It noted its 
decisions in Şahin v Turkey,12 Dahlab v Switzerland13 and Kurtulmus v Turkey14 upholding restrictions 
on the wearing of a headscarf by a university student, school teacher and university lecturer 
respectively. It stressed that in Kurtulmus, Strasbourg had concluded that ‘the prohibition on the 
wearing of the veil was justified by imperatives linked to the principles of neutrality of the public 
service.’15  
In addition, the Court noted that its finding of a violation in the case of Ahmet Arslan v Turkey 
(where conviction for wearing religious uniforms in the street after a religious event was found to 
violate Article 9) had been partly on the basis that the Applicants in that case were in no way 
‘representatives of the state exercising public functions [who were not therefore] subject, by reason 
of their official status, to an obligation of discretion in relation to the public expression of their 
religious convictions’.16  
Thus, the Court concluded that it had already admitted ‘that States could invoke the principles of 
secularism and state neutrality to justify restrictions on the wearing of religious signs by civil 
servants [….] it is their status as public agents that distinguishes them from  ordinary citizens’.17  
The majority was conscious that the obligation of neutrality it was recognizing was strict but held 
that it was one that comes from ‘the traditional relationship upheld by the principle of the secular 
nature of the State and freedom of conscience as set out in Article 1 of the [French] Constitution.’ It 
was not for the Court, it concluded, ‘to assess [the French model] as such’. Rather it was for 
administrative judges in France ‘to verify that the administration does not do disproportionate 
damage to the freedom of conscience of public servants when the neutrality of the State is 
invoked.’18 These judges, the Court concluded, had followed the French ideas of the public service 
and the ostentatious character of the headscarf to conclude, having taken account of the impact of 
her clothing on the carrying out of her functions, that the wearing of a religious sign was a breach of 
the Applicant’s duty of neutrality justifying the failure to renew her contract.19  
Abstract Secularism and the Text of the Convention 
There are several noteworthy elements of this reasoning. As Brems notes, the Court’s statement 
that it was not for it to assess the French system ‘as such’ would involve a dangerous degree of 
                                                          
11 ibid. 
12 n 2 above. 
13 ibid. 
14 Admissibilty Decision [2006] ECHR 1169. 
15 ibid. 
16 [2010] ECHR 2261 at [48] (translation from the French). 
17 n 4 above at [64]. 
18 ibid at [68]. 
19 ibid at [69]-[72]. 
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circularity. As she puts it, the applicant could be refused a contract renewal solely on account of her 
headgear, ‘because this is the way in which France organizes secularism, and the Court should not 
question this French system as such.’20 
However, when one reads the reasons given by the Court, it is clear that it does assess the legitimacy 
of the French system of state secularism ‘as such’. It states explicitly that it stands by the Court’s 
assessment in earlier cases that the principle of secularism is one that is in conformity with the 
values underlying the Convention.21 Nonetheless, the Court seems reluctant to be entirely clear 
about what this assessment entails. Although it notes that it has consistently approved of secularism 
in general (and restrictive measures to protect it) as being in line with the values of the Convention, 
it seems unsure how to justify this conclusion with regard to the text of the Convention.  
This is because allowing the constitutional principle of secularism per se (rather than individual 
instances of secularist policies preventing concrete harm to individuals such as vulnerable patients) 
runs into textual difficulties. As Judge O’Leary pointed out, the list of grounds justifying restrictions 
on freedom of religion in Article 9(2) of the Convention is exhaustive. These grounds, namely ‘the 
interests of public safety, […] the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others’22, do not provide any immediately obvious grounds for a policy of 
strict neutrality that is not linked to the prevention of a concrete harm to another individual. 
The Court’s discussion of the legitimacy of the goal pursued by the restriction of the Applicant’s 
religious freedom in paragraph 53 attempts to get around this by collapsing the discussion of the 
concrete reason (the impact on vulnerable patients) and that of the abstract reason, into one. Judge 
O’Leary picks up on this weakness. The judgment, she notes, combines ‘a fairly concrete assessment 
of proportionality based on the particular functions exercised by the applicant […] [and] the context 
in which those functions were carried out […]’ with ‘a much more abstract assessment of 
proportionality, rooted in the very abstract nature of the principles of neutrality and secularism’.23 
Judge O’Leary supported the finding of no violation based on the concrete reasons offered in 
relation to the Applicant’s work and the context it was carried out (i.e. the vulnerability of 
psychiatric patients) but was critical of the Court’s acceptance of the more abstract reason arguing 
that ‘the abstract nature of the principles relied on to defeat the right under Article 9, tended also to 
render abstract this assessment’.24 This, she said, was in tension with the stress laid by the Court in 
Eweida and Others v United Kingdom on the need to provide ‘evidence of any real encroachment on 
the interests of others’.25 The majority, she suggested, had failed to engage in the kind of careful 
examination of limitations on rights required by the Grand Chamber when ‘Member States rely on 
                                                          
20 E. Brems ‘Ebrahimian v France: Headscarf Ban Upheld for the Entire Public Sector’ 27 November 
2015, Available at: http://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/11/27/ebrahimian-v-france-headscarf-
ban-upheld-for-entire-public-sector/ last accessed 2 February 2015. 
21 n 9 above. 
22 n 4 above, partially dissenting opinion of Judge O’Leary. 
23 ibid.  
24 ibid. 
25 ibid. 
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flexible notions, principles and ideas to justify interferences with the freedom to manifest one’s 
religion’.26  
Problems with Rights-Based Defences of Secularism  
The points raised by Judge O’Leary reflect important contemporary debates in political and 
constitutional theory in relation to the justification for the secular state, and highlight the degree to 
which the Strasbourg Court faces serious problems in ensuring that its case law can accommodate 
constitutional principles that can be of vital importance but which are not directly related to issues 
of fundamental rights. 
The concrete and abstract defenses offered by the French authorities reflect two different views on 
what best justifies the principle of state secularism. Justifying restrictions on religious expression in 
state contexts with reference to the impact on the rights of others that such expression may involve, 
sees the duty of religious neutrality as necessary to avoid either coercing citizens to follow a faith or 
violating the equal status of religious minorities who may feel excluded by apparent endorsement of 
a faith other than their own.  
The alternative view is that secularism and the duty of religious neutrality arises not from the need 
to protect fundamental rights27 but from the need for a religiously-diverse population to share state 
institutions. On this view, religion is a phenomenon particularly likely to lead to intractable political 
conflict. Accordingly the state must be strictly religiously neutral in order to avoid religiously-
motivated political conflict. This approach involves distinguishing between the private sphere, where 
individuals can express whatever religious views they please, and the state sphere where the right to 
express one’s faith must be restricted in order to uphold the principle of religious neutrality. On this 
analysis, the problem with religious expression by a state employee is not that such expression 
violates the rights of those using state services. Instead, at work religious expression by civil servants 
is problematic because it undermines the idea of the religious neutrality of the state and may thus 
lead to attempts by religions to achieve symbolic prominence in state institutions. In addition, if 
those working for the state are seen as religiously partisan, this may lead to a reduction in the ability 
of the state to hold the allegiance of religious diverse population and may bring an increased risk of 
destructive religious contestation for state power.  
The rights-based view of secularism has been prominent amongst American defenders of separation 
of church and state in recent times. Dworkin suggested that state endorsement of any particular 
faith (including symbolic endorsement) involved a failure to show equal concern for all citizens and 
therefore was a violation of the right of each individual to equal respect.28 Sager and Eisgruber argue 
that symbolic endorsement of a faith by the state is a disparagement to those who are of a different 
                                                          
26 ibid, quoting S.A.S. v France, above n 1 at [122]. 
27 It should be noted that, even if secularism is not justified by the need to protect individual rights, 
given the patriarchal and illiberal nature of the mainstream teachings  of many faiths, restricting 
religious influence over law may have the effect of protecting key fundamental rights. 
28 R. Dworkin, Religion without God, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).  
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faith29 while Nussbaum bases the state’s duty of symbolic neutrality on the basis that those of other 
faiths will suffer from a sense of exclusion.30  
However, rights-based justifications struggle to provide adequate support for requirements that 
impose a strict symbolic neutrality either on the state or those who work for it. As Laborde has 
pointed out, liberal states endorse, symbolically or otherwise, a range of controversial views.31 A 
monarchist will be offended by the symbols of the French state just as a republican will be offended 
by the symbols of the United Kingdom. Liberal states also endorse ideas such as democracy and 
racial and sexual equality that are rejected by some people.  
It is unclear what fundamental right is violated by state endorsement of a particular religious 
belief.32 There is no recognized human right not to hear particular kinds of argument in political life 
or not to see particular symbols in state contexts. This point is made indirectly in the dissent of 
Judge Gaetano which criticizes the ‘false (and,[…] very dangerous) premise […] that the users of 
public services cannot be guaranteed an impartial service if the public official serving them manifests 
in the slightest way his or her religious affiliation’.33 There is no reason to think that the mere fact of 
a display of a religious symbol necessarily deprives an individual of an impartial service. A social 
welfare official may dispense welfare payments cheerfully and pleasantly to all while wearing a 
headscarf or crucifix. Indeed, if equal service provision is all that matters, a judge who deals fairly 
with all cases that come before her while wearing a cross or badge of her preferred political party 
will not have violated the rights of any individual. 
If secularism can restrict religious freedom only to the extent necessary to protect individuals from 
concrete harm to their fundamental rights, then only very limited forms of secularism can be 
permitted. Indeed, the limited nature of the secularism that is required to protect fundamental 
rights is reflected in the wider case law of the Strasbourg Court when it has been faced with claims 
on the part of individuals that a failure of the state to adhere to secularist neutrality has violated 
their fundamental rights. In cases such as Buscarini v San Marino34 and Lautsi v Italy35 (challenges to 
a mandatory religious oath for parliamentary deputies and to the presence of a crucifix on the walls 
of Italian state schools) the Court has required applicants to show oppression, not a mere lack of 
neutrality, to establish a violation of the Convention.36 Thus, forcing deputies to recite a religious 
                                                          
29 C. Eisgruber and L. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007). 
30 M. Nussbaum Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press 2013) 5-7. 
31 C. Laborde, ‘Religious Freedom without God’ (2014) (94)(4) Boston University Law Review 1255 at 
1266-68. 
32 R. McCrea, ‘Rights, Recourse to the Courts and the Relationship between Religion, Law and State 
in Europe and the United States’ EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2016/09, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, European University Institute. See also, R. McCrea ‘The Consequences of 
Disaggregation and the Impossibility of a Third Way’ in A. Bardon and C. Laborde (eds) Religion in 
Liberal Political Philosophy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, forthcoming). 
33 n 4 above, dissenting opinion of Judge De Gaetano. 
34 [1999] ECHR 7. 
35 [2011] ECHR 2412. 
36 See I. Leigh and R. Adhar, ‘Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How God 
Never Really Went Away’ (2012) 75 MLR 1064. 
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oath (Buscarini) was a violation, the continuation of the tradition of the presence of the ‘passive 
symbol’ on the wall of classrooms in a school system found to be generally pluralist and tolerant was 
not (Lautsi).  
Secularism as a Constitutional Choice and the ECHR 
The Strasbourg Court therefore has a problem when it is faced with states seeking to uphold secular 
systems. If fundamental rights can only justify limited forms of secularism, this raises the issue of 
how the Court is to respond when, as in Ebrahimian, it is faced with a state that for reasons not 
solely related to rights, wishes to uphold a more extensive form of secularism. On the one hand, it 
has repeatedly recognized that secularism, and measures to defend it, are compatible with the 
Convention and its values. On the other hand, the list of justifications for restrictions of religious 
freedom set out in Article 9(2) provide little scope for the kind of prudential, non-rights based 
considerations that were the historical origins of the secular system (and which, for many continue 
to provide its most rational defence).37 
One option, seen in Refah Partisi v Turkey38 (a challenge to the dissolution of a party found to be 
seeking to institute a system based on religious law), is to seek to find threats to rights in the 
violation of secular principles. In Refah the Court found that a system based on Sharia law would 
violate key rights such as privacy, gender equality and the prohibition on inhuman and degrading 
treatment, thus allowing it to uphold the dissolution of a party that sought to make such law the 
basis of the legal system.39 However, this involves the Court in the highly problematic endeavor of 
interpreting religious law and declaring it to be compatible or incompatible with human rights, 
potentially leaving it open to charges of prejudice, essentialisation of faiths or theological error. 
Furthermore, this rationale only applies to religions that can be seen as threats to human rights 
(could a party seeking a Quaker theocracy be dissolved on this basis?) and may encourage the Court 
to recognize relatively trivial harms as rights violations in order to be able to shoe-horn abstract 
secularism into the narrow categories of Article 9(2).  
Alternatively, the Court could recognize that it must be possible for States to restrict rights in order 
to serve fundamental constitutional principles which do not themselves necessarily aim to protect 
fundamental rights. The reasons for this can be varied. Given that religious identity is usually fixed 
and religious beliefs tend to be comprehensive and to cover ultimate issues such as life and death, 
religion may be seen as particularly disruptive of political cooperation and stability.40 Indeed, the 
idea of secular politics first arose as a result of the destructiveness of religious contestation for 
political power in Europe, not out of rights claims.41 Secularism is not the only principle whose 
justifications arise from considerations not directly linked to the protection of fundamental rights. 
Rules preventing the use of French in most Flanders municipalities restrict free expression and 
cannot be justified as a defence of the individual rights of Dutch speakers as they will remain able to 
communicate with the municipality in their native language whether French is allowed or not. 
Rather, they are justified by the need to protect the principle of territoriality in relation to language 
                                                          
37 n 32 above. 
38 n 3 above. 
39 ibid at [123]. 
40 C. Laborde, Liberalism’s Religion (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2016, forthcoming). 
41 M. Lilla, The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics and the Modern West (New York: Knopf, 2007). 
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use in Belgium which is necessary for the French and Dutch speakers to remain part of a common 
State. Similarly, a rule preventing a social welfare clerk in Northern Ireland who treats all in an 
equally friendly and efficient manner, from wearing a symbol indicating that her allegiances are to 
the Nationalist or Unionist community is justified not by the rights of those dealing with her but by 
the need to ensure that both communities in Northern Ireland can share a set of state institutions in 
the context of a salient and potentially disruptive dispute about the identity of province.  
Although critics of the decision in Ebrahimian have claimed that objective evidence of bias is 
needed42 to justify restrictions on the ability of public servants to wear contentious symbols, the 
common law has generally required evidence not of actual bias but of a reasonable perception of 
bias.43 Harmful consequences can arise from purely symbolic departures from neutrality. To allow a 
judge to wear the badge of a particular political party while carrying out her functions does damage 
to valuable principles (such as the separation between the personal identity of the office holder and 
the office) even if her judgments contain no actual bias. Thus, there may be very good reasons for 
restricting the right of state employees to express their identity at work that cannot be justified on 
the basis of a need to avoid concrete harm to the rights of others. 
Secularism’s commitment to allowing a religiously diverse population to share a single set of political 
institutions by distinguishing between a religiously-neutral public sphere and a private sphere where 
religion can flourish, can be compatible with the values of the Convention, but the Court cannot 
avoid the fact that the text of Article 9 as currently interpreted has a very limited list of reasons 
other than rights protection that justify restricting religious freedom and therefore struggles to 
accommodate any but the most minimal secularism. Attempting to obscure this problem by citing 
concrete, context-specific reasons that religious expression in a particular context may harm rights, 
and then collapsing this concrete justification into a larger abstract justification based on the need to 
protect secularism per se, is not satisfactory. The Court will eventually have to grasp the nettle and 
find scope for non-rights based constitutional principles within Article 9(2). 
There is scope witin the case law for it to do so. As Trispiotis points out ‘extra-textual principles are 
familiar from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. […] Mutual respect, toleration and solidarity have 
been repeatedly employed to outline the scope of various rights, including freedom of religion and 
freedom of assembly and association.’44 He notes how ‘peaceful coextistence’ between students was 
cited as reason to restrict religious symbols in universities in Karaduman, ‘democratic pluralism’ and 
‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness’ could justify state restrictions on ‘unwarranted and 
offensive’ attacks on matters regarded as sacred by Muslims in I.A. v Turkey.45 As religious 
competition for access to symbolic or substantive state power can produce particularly intractable 
conflict, the abstract principle of secularism can readily be seen to serve the goal of ‘mutual respect, 
toleration and solidarity’ and ‘peaceful coexistence’. In Ebrahimian, however, the Court seems 
unwilling to admit clearly that it is this aim, rather than weaker, rights-focused concerns, that it is 
accommodating, and engages in a sleight of hand that collapses discussion of the legitimacy of 
                                                          
42 n 20 above. 
43 Most famously affirmed in R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet (No 
2) [2000] 1 AC 119. 
44 I. Trispiotis, Freedom of Religion, Equality and Discrimination in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Ph.D. Thesis, University College London, 2016) at 168-74. 
45 ibid. 
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abstract secularism into the discussion of the legitimacy of measures that aim to protect the 
religious freedom of users of the specific services provided by Ms. Ebrahimian’s employer. Its 
evasiveness in this regard undermines the strength of its judgment.  
Proportionality in Cases of Symbolic Harm 
One final issue to note is the degree to which abstract claims raise difficulties in the assessment of 
proportionality. In previous cases, the Court has seen the severity of the consequence of loss of 
employment as relevant to the assessment of the proportionality. In Eweida the Court abandoned 
previous decisions that had held that the right to resign adequately protected freedom of religion 
and said that the better approach was to weigh the possibility of changing jobs in the balance when 
considering whether the restriction of the Applicant’s religious freedom was proportionate.46 In Obst 
and Schuth the Court found that the difficulty that a church organist would face in finding work 
outside of the church was a relevant factor in the assessment of the proportionality of the decision 
of the national courts to uphold his dismissal for having engaged in an extra-marital relationship. 47 
In Ebrahimian, the French authorities had adopted a very wide definition of public servants (the 
Applicant had been working on a contractual basis for a public hospital). In these circumstances it is 
likely that the Applicant will be faced with a clash between her religious freedom and a very wide 
range of jobs (particularly in France where the state sector is a particularly large section of the 
economy). It is therefore unfortunate that the Court did not address this element of the case in its 
proportionality assessment. 
That is not to say that, had it done so, a different result would inevitably have been reached. It is an 
unfortunate feature of cases such as this where the aim to avoid symbolic harm clashes with the 
desire to take a symbolic stand, that the balancing of the two claims is simply impossible. If the point 
of a state’s restriction of religious freedom is to ensure symbolic neutrality of the public service, 
then any symbolic departure, however slight, will defeat this goal. This ‘all or nothing’ scenario is like 
that which applied in the case of Lillian Ladele. She lost her Article 9 challenge to her dismissal for 
violating her employer’s ‘Dignity for All’ policy by refusing to register same-sex civil partnerships. As 
the point of the policy in question was to prevent the damage to dignity inherent in acts of 
discrimination, any accommodation of her discriminatory wish would have entirely defeated the aim 
of this policy. 48 One could argue that the restriction in Ladele had a more concrete basis that the 
more abstract goal of protecting state neutrality cited in Ebrahimian as it aimed to prevent 
discrimination against same sex couples.49 However, once secularism and neutrality are accepted as 
legitimate aims (something the Court has repeatedly held) then the importance of this distinction 
disappears as the issue becomes whether the relevant legitimate aim (be it neutrality or non-
                                                          
46 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37. 
47 Obst v Germany ECtHR Application no 425/03, 23 September 2010. Schuth v Germany ECtHR 
Application 1620/03, 23 September 2010. 
48 See R. McCrea ‘Religion in the Workplace: Eweida and Others v United Kingdom’ (2014) 77 MLR 
277.  
49 As noted above, the Court in Ebrahimian also offered concrete reasons based on the impact the 
wearing of religious symbols by staff may have on vulnerable patients but for the purposes of this 
article, the most important issue is the degree to which protection of secularism in the abstract was 
recognized as a legitimate reason to restrict religious expression (rather than relying on instances 
where secularist principles can be shown to be protecting the rights and freedoms of others). 
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discrimination) can be achieved by less burdensome means and whether the overall impact on the 
right in question is disproportionate. 
In both Ebrahimian and in Ms. Ladele’s case, balancing between the legitimate aim (neutrality/non-
discrimination respectively) and the protected right was impossible within the workplace. Therefore 
in such cases the proportionality test will have to focus on the question of whether the context in 
which the restriction on expression takes place is narrow enough to allow adequate scope to express 
one’s beliefs and identity in other contexts.  The Strasbourg Court, in dismissing Ms. Ladele’s claim, 
did not provide a detailed proportionality analysis, merely noting that the importance of preventing 
discrimination meant that the national authorities had not exceeded the margin of appreciation. The 
national courts were more forthcoming. The UK Court of Appeal noted that the restriction on Ms. 
Ladele’s freedom of religion could be seen as proportionate because it was impossible to 
accommodate her desire not to serve gay and lesbian couples without undermining the ‘non-
discriminatory objectives which [her employer] thought it important to espouse both to their staff 
and to the wider community’50 and because outside of her job, ‘she remained free to hold [her] 
beliefs and free to worship as she wished’.51 On this analysis, the possibility of holding and 
expressing her beliefs out of work rendered the absolute restriction at work proportionate. 
If proportionality is to be achieved by delineating the sphere (i.e. the workplace) within which 
restrictions on expression are to apply, rather than by limiting the degree of restriction within that 
sphere, the Court’s protection of the privacy rights of workers to engage in activities of their 
choosing out of work will be increasingly important. The Court has been sympathetic to the principle 
that out of work activities should not be the basis for dismissal in cases such as Redfearn v UK52 
though in other instances it has upheld such dismissals.53 The Court recently adopted a very broad 
version of the right of employers to fire employees with partly religious tasks for out of work 
conduct in Fernandez-Martinez v Spain.54 Were the kind of duty to discretion outside of work 
recognized in that case applied to public servants, then the extent of the restriction on religious 
freedom of those working in the public service would almost certainly become excessive and 
disproportionate. The legitimacy of the secular system (and its claim to restrict religious freedom in 
a proportionate way) very much depends on vigilant policing of the boundary between state and 
non-state, and public and private contexts.  
Conclusion 
Religion is both a series of beliefs to be chosen or rejected and a form of personal identity that is 
lived as a communal matter and is, in reality, rarely changed. Defining religion as a matter of choice 
and belief will often lead to results which are the direct opposite of those which would arise from 
treating it as an immutable form of personal identity. It is therefore difficult for the ECtHR to come 
                                                          
50 Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357 at [49]. 
51 ibid. at [50]. 
52 [2012] ECHR 1878. Here the Court found a violation in respect termination of the employment of a 
bus driver for active membership in an extremist political party. 
53 See Pay v UK [2009] IRLR 139 where the Court found no violation due to the failure of the 
applicant to take steps to ensure that no link could be made between his involvement in sado-
masochistic sexual activities and his work as a probation officer.  See V. Mantouvalou ‘Human Rights 
and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces (2008) 71 MLR 912. 
54 [2014] ECHR 886. 
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up with solutions that give significant weight to all of the elements that make up religion. French 
rules on the absence of religious symbols from state contexts treat religion as a form of belief and 
religious symbols as forms of ideological expression that ought not to appear within state contexts. 
In other contexts, such as the prohibition on discrimination in service provision, religion is treated by 
the law as something more akin to a fundamental personal characteristic such as gender.55 Treating 
religion in different ways in different contexts is not necessarily wrong. There is a range of factors 
that affect how religion should be regarded in any situation. When assessing anti-proselytism laws it 
makes sense for a liberal state to view religion as a matter of belief and choice. When dealing with 
the right to receive services in a private shop, it may make more sense to view it as a form of 
personal identity. In other cases, such as the scenario in Ebrahimian, it is less clear which approach 
should be taken. There are good reasons for either option.  
As long as there were reasonable grounds for accepting the French authorities’ characterisation of 
religious expression in the circumstances of the case, the Strasbourg Court was not likely to 
intervene. Indeed, even those who were critical of the decision in Ebrahimian conceded that they 
were not surprised by the result.56 The Court has permitted states to view religious expression in 
state institutions as ideological expression in an inappropriate context. The ECtHR had previously 
repeatedly endorsed secularism as consistent with Convention values and had previously upheld the 
strict application of secularist principles in the educational context. Extending this toleration of the 
rigorous application of secularist principles to the public service as a whole was therefore not 
unexpected. 
Despite frequent allegations (including in the dissenting opinions in Ebrahimian) that the Court has 
displayed bias in favour of Christian symbols and against Islamic ones, the approach of the ECtHR has 
actually been consistent. Rulings, including that in Ebrahimian, have consistently stressed that there 
are deep reasonable differences on how best to arrange the relationship between religion and state 
in Europe, and the Court has adopted a consistently ‘hands-off’ approach. It has intervened only 
where arrangements are notably oppressive and has concluded that a broad range of diverse 
arrangements in this area are compatible with the ECHR. Thus, it has found that there are 
sufficiently good reasons supporting a member state decision to restrict the presence of religious 
symbols in state schools57 but that it is also not beyond the range of reasonable options for states to 
maintain the traditional presence of some religious symbols in classrooms provided that the overall 
effect is not oppressive.58 Certainly, a hands-off approach is likely to be disadvantageous for minority 
religions but the overall approach is clear and consistent: deference to states in the context of 
abiding, salient and deep reasonable differences.   
Though the result was consistent with previous caselaw, the Court’s reasoning in this case was 
unfortunately unclear. The well-argued points made by Judge O’Leary highlight the tension between 
                                                          
55 For a discussion of the difference between religious freedom as a choice right and the idea of 
religion as a form of identity that underpins the prohibition of discrimination and grounds of religion 
see R. McCrea ‘Singing from the Same Hymn-Sheet? What the Differences between the Strasbourg 
and Luxembourg Courts Tell Us about Religious Freedom, Non-Discrimination and the Secular State’ 
(2016) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (forthcoming).  
56 n 20 above. 
57 n 2 above, Dahlab v Switzerland. 
58 n 35 above. 
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the relatively narrow and exhaustive grounds listed in Article 9(2) and the repeated statement by 
the Court that the abstract constitutional principle of secularism is in line with values of the 
Convention. This is not to suggest that the Court should restrict Member Stats to the narrow and 
limited form of secularism that can be justified by the need to defend fundamental rights.  Such an 
option involves an a-historical neglect of the significant non-rights based reasons for secularism and 
would provoke a clash between the Convention and the deepest constitutional principles of at least 
one member state, principles which have been developing following an intense process of 
democratic debate in the state in question.  
However, the Court must be clear about what it is doing. If it is to endorse more abstract secularism, 
it should own up to the fact that such endorsement involves factors beyond the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. This need not involve a radical break with its caselaw. The Court has 
found room in its jurisprudence to uphold prudential arrangements that seek to defuse abiding and 
salient cleavages within political communities such as those relating to language in Belgium59 and 
religion can be a source of division that is deeper, more durable and more intense than language. In 
addition, as Trispiotis shows, extra-textual reasons have featured prominently in the Court’s caselaw 
in other religion-related cases.  
This more expansive approach is inevitable and desirable. Rights do not provide a full account of the 
key elements of our political and social arrangements, particularly in relation to religion and its 
relationship to the state.60 That said, it must be acknowledged that a more expansive approach to 
justifications for restricting religious freedom will bring a significant danger that a fundamental right 
will be increasingly subject to majoritarian whims. The Court will have to be vigilant to ensure that 
when a state invokes extra-textual principles, such principles are in fact in line with underlying 
Convention values and that they are not being manipulated as a vehicle to promote majoritarian 
prejudices or to exercise domination over minorities. Judge O’Leary is right that allowing abstract 
principles to qualify rights brings significant dangers of restriction of fundamental rights on vague 
and potentially limitless grounds. Although matters of constitutional and political theory are difficult 
for the Strasbourg Court to deal with, it may be unavoidable for the Court to make the normative 
basis of its approach more clear. Neutrality cannot be a goal in itself and if it is to be invoked to 
restrict fundamental rights, the Court will have to specify what goals and values it sees such 
neutrality as protecting. Finally, in relation to secularism more specifically, the Court must be 
rigorous in ensuring that, as it did in Ahmet Arslan,61 secularist reasons are used only to justify in 
restrictions on religious expression the state sphere and that they are not permitted to provide the 
basis for restrictions of the right to live out one’s religious identity in the non-state arena. 
 
 
                                                          
59 Belgian Linguistics Case [1968] ECHR 3. 
60 See n 32 above. 
61 n 16 above. 
